As you know, 2 weeks ago I was at
Perimeter Institute for the workshop on the
Laws of Nature: Their Nature and Knowability. It was a very interesting event, bringing together physicists with philosophers, a mix that isn't always easy to deal with.
People (them)On
the list of participants, you'll find some well known names. Besides the usual suspects Julian Barbour and Lee Smolin, Paul Davies was there (though only for the first day), Anthony Aquirre (the event was sponsored by
FQXi) and of course several people from PI and the University of Waterloo.
In my previous post, I already wrote about Marcelo Gleiser's talk. Marcelo is from Brazil, and he is apparently well known there for his popular science books (
which was confirmed by Christine in an earlier post.) I had frankly never heard of him before. I talked to him later over dinner, and he told me
he writes for a group blog called 13.7 together with, among others, Stuart Kauffman who is also well known for his popular science books. (13.7 is the estimated age of the universe in billion years. What will they do if that number gets updated?)
Another interesting name on the list of participants is
Roberto Unger, who is a well-known Brazilian politician and besides that a professor for law at Harvard Law School, and author of multiple books on social and political theory. He apparently has an interest not only in the laws of societies, but also in the laws of Nature*. And finally let me mention George Musser was also at the workshop. George writes for Scientific American and is author of
The Complete Idiot’s Guide to String Theory. He turned out to be a very nice guy with the journalist's theme "I want to know more about that."
Talks (their)Now let me say a word about the talks. First, and most important,
all the talks were recorded and are available on PIRSA here. The talks on the first day were heavily philosophical. I will admit that I often have problems making sense of that. Not because I don't have an interest in philosophy, but because one frequently ends up arguing about the meaning of words which is, at the bottom of things, a consequence of lacking definitions and thus a waste of time. Yes, my apologies, I'm, duh, a theoretical physicist with some semesters maths on my CV. If I don't see a definition and an equation, I get lost easily. In some cases it seems the philosophers imply some specific meaning that they just never bother to explain. But in other cases they'll start arguing about it themselves, and that's when I usually zoom out wondering what's the point in arguing if they don't know what they're arguing about anyway.
The most interesting event on the first day was arguably
Lee Smolin's and Roberto Unger's shared talk "Laws and Time in Cosmology". Let me add that I've heard Smolin talking about the "reality of time" several times and I still can't make sense of it. The problem I have is simply that I don't know what he's talking about. This recent talk didn't change anything about my confusion, but if you haven't heard it before, you might find it inspiring. Unger's talk is very impressive on the rhetorical side. Unfortunately, it made even less sense to me than Lee's talk. For all I can see, there's no tension neither between a block-universe and a notion of simultaneity nor between a block-universe and causality, as I think I heard Unger saying (thus my question in the end). Point is, I don't understand the problem they're attempting to address to begin with. I see no problem.
As Barbara Streisand already told us "Life is a moment in space" and "In love there is no measure of time." Consequently, a universe where time is real must be loveless. I don't like that idea.
On that note, let me recommend
Julian Barbour's talk "A case for geometry". Julian is a charming British guy and he has his own theory of a lovely, timeless universe. I don't buy a word of what he says, but his talk is very accessible and fun to listen to. It makes your head spin what he's saying, just try it out, it's very intriguing. I am curious to see how these ideas will develop, it seems to me they might be on the brink of actually making predictions. (A somewhat more detailed explanation of his ideas is
here, audio becomes audible at 3:30 min.)
On the second day, we had several talks discussing concrete proposals for how one could think of the laws of Nature off the trodden path. You probably won't be surprised to hear that one of the suggestions is that of
"Law without Law: Entropic Dynamics" by Ariel Caticha. It is not directly related to
Erik Verlinde's entropic gravity, but certainly plays in the same corner of the room: exploiting the possibility that fundamentally all our dynamics is simply a consequence of the increase of entropy. Ariel's talk however isn't really recommendable, it sits on a funny edge between too many and too few details.
Another approach is Kevin Knuth's who put forward in his talk
"The Role of Order in Natural Law" the idea that on the basis of all, there's order - in a well-defined mathematical sense. I can't avoid the impression though that even if this worked out to reproduce the standard model, it would merely be a reformulation. Kevin's talk was basically a summary of
this recent paper. And Philip Goyal gave a very nice talk on
"The common symmetries underlying quantum theory, probability theory, and number systems." I have a lot of sympathy for the attempt to reconstruct quantum theory, it's just that I don't understand why literally all the quantum foundations guys hang themselves up on the measurement process in quantum mechanics. For what I'm concerned, quantum field theory is the thing, and I'm still waiting for somebody to reconstruct the non-commutativity of annihilation and creation operators.
Finally, let me mention Kevin Kelley's talk
"How does simplicity help science find true laws?" Kelley is a philosopher from Carnegie Mellon, and in his talk he explored whether it is possible to put Ockham's Razor on a rational basis. Unfortunately, while the theme could in principle have been very interesting, his talk is not particularly accessible. He assumed way too much knowledge from the audience. At least I get very easily frustrated when technical terms are dropped and procedures are mentioned without being explained, since it's not a field I work in. In any case, I'll spare you the time watching the full thing and just mention an interesting remark that came up in the discussion. Apparently there have been efforts to create a computer software that could simulate a "scientist," in this case for the example of trying to extract a theory from data of the motion of the planets. At least so far, such attempts failed (if anybody knows a reference, it would be highly appreciated.) So it seems, for the time being, scientists will not be replaced by computers.
At the end of the last day we had a discussion session, moderated by Steven Weinstein, wrapping up some of the topics that came up the previous days and some others. One of them is the question about the power of mathematics and if there are limits to what humans can grasp (
a theme we have previously discussed here). For a fun anecdote making the point well, watch
Steven at 1:13:50 min ("I remember distinctively being in a graduate quantum mechanics class by Bob Wald...") Of course Tegmark's mathematical universe made an appearance as well,
another topic we have previously discussed on this blog. For what I am concerned, declaring that all is mathematics may be some sort of unification of the laws of Nature, alright, but it's eventually a completely useless unification. And that brings me to...
Thoughts (mine)On several occasions at the workshop, I felt like the stereotypical physicist among philosophers, and it took me a while to figure out what I found lacking at this workshop. You could say I'm a very pragmatic person. There's even an ism that belongs to that! If you talk about reality and truth, I don't know what you mean, and I actually don't care. This is just words. I'll start caring if you tell me what it's good for. If you want to reformulate the laws of physics, fine, go ahead. But if you want me to spend time on it, you'll have to tell me what the advantage is. If there's two theories and they make the same predictions, that doesn't cause me headaches. For what I'm concerned, if they make the same predictions, they're the same theory.
What matters in the end about a law or a theory or a model is not whether it's philosophically appealing and not even if there's a rational process by which it's been selected (and btw, what means "rational" anyway), but simply whether it's useful. And usefulness is eventually a notion deeply connected to human societies and values. For that reason I think to understand the scientific method and its success one inevitably needs to take into account the dynamics of the communities and the embedding of scientific knowledge into our societies. (It should be clear that with usefulness I don't necessarily mean technical applications as I have recently expressed in
this post.)
Leaving aside that I found this aspect entirely missing to the discussions about the process of science itself and its possible limitations, the workshop has given me a lot to think about. Having said that the pragmatist in me searches for the use in all that enters my ears, I nevertheless have enough fantasy to imagine that some of the themes discussed at the workshop will become central to shaping our thinking about the laws of Nature in the future and thus eventually prove their usefulness. It was a very stimulating meeting and the approaches that were presented are all as bold as courageous. It will be interesting to follow the progress of these thoughts.
*I once made an attempt to read one of Unger's books, What should the left propose? I had to look up every second word in a dictionary, and even that didn't always help. When I had, after an hour or so, roughly deciphered the meaning of a page it seemed to me one could have said the same in one simple sentence, avoiding 3 or more syllable words. I gave up on page 20. Sorry for being so incredibly unintellectual, but to me language is first and foremost a means of communication. If you want to be heard, you better use a code that the receiver can decipher. Friedrich Engels, for example, was an excellent writer...